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non-intAbstract: Many organizations implement Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) as the first line of 
fromerdefense for their security systems. Up to now, the researchers have developed IDS in many 
IDS alEcomputer environments. Having detected the signs of intrusions, IDS trigger alerts to report them. 
underslThese alerts are presented to human analyst to be evaluated and initiates adequate responses. But, 
manually analyzing those alerts are tedious, time-consuming and error-prone. The reasons for 
Realizi
this: (1) the number of alerts is enormous, and (2) most of them are false alerts. A promising fSystem (lDRS:
method to automate the alert analysis is finding the correlation between alerts, and such system is 
/; ttlerts indepeneknown as Alert Correlation System (ACS). One of the major applications of alert correlation 
These alerts wi(AC) is attack diagnosis. Interestingly, researchers have different kind of views to define the 
Intrusive ReSJl 
concept of AC. Furthermore, a various types of techniques have been proposed in AC: (1) to 
reduce the false alerts, and (2) to find causality relationship between alerts to extract the strategies 
of attacker. This paper discussed the challenges of ACS and the most importantly presents a 
review of techniques and solutions proposed in the course of the last ten years, while comparing 
their advantages and limitations. The survey is followed by the presentation of potential future 
This ~ 
research directions in this area. 
the fundamen 
problems faceKeywords: information assurance and security, alert correlation, alert analysis, intrusion 
This is follm detection, preventive system. 
discussing tht 
worth to look 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) have been extensively used by researchers and practitioners to 
maintain trustworthiness in computer environments [1,2]. A major problem in the IDS is the 
guarantee for the intrusion detection. This is the reason why in many cases IDS are used together 
with a human expert (or analyst). In this way, IDS is actually helping the human expert and it is 
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not reliable enough to be trusted on its own. Among the limitations of current IDS that lead to the 
research of alert correlation (AC) include: 
I) IDS generates a huge number of alerts [3-9]. For example, in [8] "five IDS sensors 
reported 40MB of alert data within ten days, and a large fraction of these alerts are false 
positives". This problem is acknowledged by practioners [2] that "IDSs trigger thousands 
of alerts per day". 
2) IDS cannot ensure that all alerts reflect actual attacks. The 'true positives' (i.e., attacks 
detected as intrusive) alerts are usually mixed with 'false positives' alerts (i.e., benign 
activities detected as intrusive) [10-13]. Worse, only I% of the enormous amount of IDS 
alerts corresponds to unique attacks. The remainders are false positives (i.e., alerts on 
non-intrusive actions), repeated warnings for the same attack, or alert notifications arising 
from erroneous activity or configuration artifacts [8,9]. 
3) IDS alerts bring low-level information [13]. This make human analyst hardly to (directly) 
understand the security state of the protected network and study the attack strategies [14]. 
Realizing of this shortcoming, IDS will be upgraded to Intrusion Detection and Response 
System (IDRS)[ 1]. Briefly, as shown in Figure I, once the intrusion is detected, IDS will raise 
alerts independently (for each attack), though there may be logical connections between them. 
These alerts will be processed and analyzed using Alert Correlation System (ACS) to facilitate the 
Intrusive Response System (IRS). IRS is responsible to plan and develop effective response 
mechanisms. Automation of ACS is very important not only because to achieve a reliable and 
accurate response plans, but to reveal the continuously changing attack strategies. On the other 
hand, details on the taxonomy ofIRS can be found in [17], and also its survey in [18]. 
This paper is focused on the second part of IDRS, the ACS. In specific, Section 2 defines 
the fundamental concept and its conceptual framework. Section 3 discusses the AC issues and 
problems faced by researchers. Section 4 explores the existing ACapproaches and techniques. 
This is followed by Section 5 which presents comparative analysis of existing ACSs while 
discussing their advantages and drawbacks. Section 6 proposes open research problems that are 
worth to look into in the area of AC. Finally, Section 7 concluded this paper. 
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Figure 1. An Intrusion Detection and Response System (IDRS). 
2. ALERT CORRELATION 
A promising technique to analyze intrusion detection (ID) alerts is called Alert Correlation [10, 
15,16]. In reality, ID community has brought the idea of managing alerts from the network 
surveillance where alert correlation is first used in order to reduce the workload of the analysts 
[19]. Computer networks produce thousands of alerts per day that make the task of the network 
surveillance and alert management difficult [20]. Based on this observation and the actual need 
for alert analysis and assessment, [19] introduced AC to cope with this phenomenon. Any tool or 
software system that based on the AC processes is known as Alert Correlation System (ACS). 
First, let we define correlation. In the field of mathematics and statistics, correlation is a 
simultaneous change in value of two numerically valued random variables [21]. The, positive 
correlation between cigarette smoking and the incidence of lung cancer for instance. Such 
statistical correlation is not appropriate for ID, since the researchers do not model alert streams by 
means of random variables. Correlation in analyzing alerts, however, has no consistent definition 
and has been used differently by researchers and IDS vendors [12]. Other definition of correlation 
based on a dictionary by [21] is a causal, complementary, parallel, or reciprocal relationship, 
especially a structural, functional, or qualitative correspondence between two comparable entities, 
for example a correlation between drug abuse and crime. However this definition is not very 
precise [12]. 
Precisely, the correlation in the field of alert analysis concerns finding relationships 
between alerts generated by a single (or multiple) data sources and coupling this information with 
additional knowledge [12]. It is a process that analyzes the alerts produced by one or more IDSs 
and provides a more succinct and high-level view of occurring or attempted intrusions [13]. AC is 
a challenging task in security management. Moreover, an ACS should effectively reduce the alert 
redundancy, intelligently analyze alerts and correctly identify the attack strategies. In fact, the goal 
of correlation would be to present the information generated by IDS in a meaningful way, i.e., a 
way which can be easily understood and processed by a human analyst and helping himlher 
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discover attacks and incidents. It is important to notice that the goal of correlation tasks is to help 
the human operators as much as possible, but not to replace them. 
2.1 Conceptual Framework 
The ACS framework consists of several operations. Generally, the operations for an ACS 
framework in accordance with the literature reviewed in this research area are illustrated in Figure 
2. Refering to Figure 2, in the Preprocessing phase, raw alerts are collected from one or many 
IDSs and converted to a standard format (or known as normalization), called Intrusion Detection 
Message Exchange Format (IDMEF)[22]. The alerts with all its attributes are then stored in a 
Database Management System (DBMS). To ensure the alerts are true positives, verification 
which is defined as the process of verifying the success of attacks is essential. Proposed by [23], 
it is done by comparing the configuration of the victim machine (e.g., operating system, running 
services, and service version) to the requirements for a successful attac~K When the victim is not 
vulnerable to a particular attack (because the configuration does not satisfy the attack 
requirements), then the alert can be tagged as failed. 
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Figure 2. The framework of Alert Correlation System (ACS). 
The main goal of Analysis phase is usually to get rid of most of the false alerts, not 
forgetting to merge the redundant alerts. To do this, similarity-based clustering [4] can detect 
redundancies and emerge the cluster as hyper alerts. Whilst in [8], researcher groups alerts based 
on the same root causes. The future load of alerts could be reduced by removing the most 
predominant and persistent root causes. 
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For Correlation, a common approach is defining rules or knowledge to determine the 
relationship between two alerts, as proposed in [4,7,24,25]. They predefined set of pre-condition 
and post-condition rules for each alerts, based on the observation that most attacks consists of 
many stages. Thus, alert whose post-conditions contribute to pre-conditions of the next alert can be 
correlated as previous alert preparing for the next one. These relationships construct attack 
scenarios and reveal the next goals of attacker (Le., via observation of attack graphs). In a result, 
response and preventive mechanisms can be planned and developed to avoid the damage from 
escalating and to stop the attack at earlier stage. 
3. CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS 
We classified four categories of main research issues and presented its related problems in the 
research of AC. They are in the following: 
I) Improving Quality ofAlerts (reducing redundant and false positives alerts thru alert post-
processing), 
2) Constructing Attack Scenarios, 
3) Extracting Attack Strategies to Predict Attacker's Next Goal, and 
4) Other Issues. 
con13.1 Issue 1 : Improving Quality ofAlerts 
ofit 
It is known that current IDSs generate massive amount of alerts, not only because of the 
Prol 
redundant alerts, but also the mixing of false alerts (Le., false positives and/or false negatives). 
recc: 
This situation contributes to low quality alerts. In fact, it has been estimated that up to 99% of detc 
alerts reported by lOSs are not related to security issues [8,9,26]. Reasons for this include the Fin 
following as mentioned in [27]: inje 
Runtime limitations : In many cases an intrusion differs only slightly from normal activities, ad~ 
sometimes even only the context in which the activity occurs determines whether it is 
to 
intrusive. Owing to harsh real-time requirements, IDSs cannot analyze the context of all 
activities to the extent required [28]. 
Specificity of detection signatures : Writing signatures for lOSs is a very difficult task [29]. In vu 
some cases, the right balance between an overly specific signature (which is not able to the 
capture all attacks or their variations) and an overly general one (which recognizes [2: 
legitimate actions as intrusions) can be difficult to determine. pa 
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Dependency on environment: Actions that are normal in certain environments may be malicious 
in others [30]. For example, performing a network scan is malicious unless the computer 
performing it has been authorized to do so. lOSs deployed with the standard out-of-the-
box configuration will most likely identify many normal activities as malicious. 
As a result, the problem of false positives is critical in 10 and has received considerable 
attention from researchers as well as practitioners [12] in different levels. There are four different 
levels of researches (as illustrated in Figure 3 [12]) that aim to resolve the false positives problem 
in the area of IDRS. 
10 Analyst 
Figure 3. Evolution of the scope for addressing false positives problem. 
Levell  - Improving IDS themselves. Most of the efforts focused on building better sensors, Le., 
sensors that detect more intrusions or sensors with very low fal~:-positive rates. In 
contrast to building general, all-purpose lOSs, specialized lOSs focus on particular types 
of intrusions or attacks promising very low false-positive rates. For example in [31], they 
proposed a network-based IDS that exclusively focus on low-level attacks such as 
reconnaissance scans and denial-of-service attacks. Billygoat [32], differently, focuses on 
detecting worms and viruses. Whilst [29] and [33] focus on introducing better signatures. 
Finally, researchers in [34,35] proposed lOS targeted at detecting application-level SQL 
injection attacks. Note that these special-purpose lOSs need to be complemented by 
additional lOSs to achieve a comprehensive attack coverage, which then creates the need 
to deploy and maintain a heterogeneous network of complementary lOSs. 
Level 2 - Leveraging the Environment. By using information about the environment (provided by 
vulnerability scanners, OS-fingerprinting or asset databases), IDSs can better understand 
the environment and significantly lower their false-positive rates. For example" work by 
[28] showed that without knowing how target hosts handle certain anomalies in network 
packets, intruders can efficiently use fragmentation to avoid being detected by network-
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based IDS. Addressing these concerns, Active Mapping [36] builds profiles of the 
environment, which can then be leveraged by IDSs. Context signatures [33], on the other 
hand, can understand application-level protocol interactions and thus detennine the 
impact of an attack. A similar effect can be achieved by correlating alerts with 
vulnerabilities for instance in [13,37]. 
Level 3 - Alert Post-processing. This level uses alerts generated by IDS as input and tries to 
improve their quality by processing them. This includes systems using data mining and 
so-called ACSs. For example in the data-mining space, Julisch [8] showed how root 
cause analysis can be used to effectively discover large groups of false positives and 
remove up to 70% of reoccurring false positives in the future. Moreover, AC, in addition 
to false positives, addresses another problem of IDS, namely, the redundancy in alert 
stream. ACSs (e.g., [4,13,38,39]) aim at producing high-level alerts and thus reduce the 
total number of alerts the IDS generates. 
Level 4 - Analyst's Involvement. Alerts generated by IDSs are passed to the human analyst to be 
analyzed in real time or with only a short delay. Very few related work on this level. 
Examples of such work are in [12,40, and 41]. Pietraszek [12] introduces a novel 
paradigm of using machine-learning techniques to reduce the number of false positives in 
ID by building classifier learning from a human analyst and assisting in the alert 
classification. 
Building better IDS (as in Level 1) that has a small number of false positives is an 
extremely difficult task [27]. Using vulnerability scanner (as in Level 2) will leave the network at 
a high risk because it can also be used by an attacker to gather infonnation about potential targets 
to identify some vulnerability that could be exploited to start an intrusion scenario [42]. While 
analyst's involvement (as in Level 4) could bring some delay (time-consuming) and unreliable as 
human's knowledge and experience is vary tu one and another. Because of these reasons, a more 
practical solution to reduce the number of false positives in ID is to work on the IDS alerts, by 
using alert post-processing (Level 3) or known as analysis algorithms [43]: such as data mining 
and machine learning [27,44], data cleansing [45], data aggregation [38], and AC [7,39,46,47]. 
Thus, the main problem in this issue is "how to filter out the false positives alerts and 
aggregating/grouping the redundant alerts". Technically, false alerts will be discarded and 
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grouped redundant alerts are merged into a meta-alert, so that the number of alerts left to be 
analyzed is decreased. 
3.2 Issue 2 : Constructing Attack Scenarios 
In situations where there are intensive intrusions, not only will actual alerts be mixed with false 
alerts, but the amount of alerts will also become unmanageable. As a result, it is difficult for 
human users or IRSs to understand the alerts and take appropriate actions. Therefore, it is 
necessary to develop techniques to construct attack scenarios (or steps that attackers use in their 
attacks) from alerts and facilitate intrusion analysis [48]. In conjunction with that, the main 
problem is "how to relate the alerts to one another so that they can build relationship to reveal 
the step-by-step attack scenarios ". Thus, human analyst will understand what are the step by step 
(previous) attacks has been launched in order to make the next attack is successful. Several AC 
methods have been proposed to address this problem. They are: 
Similarity-based approach [39,44] correlates alerts based on the similarities between alert 
attributes. The similarity between attributes is detennined by the similarity function 
defined. Though they are effective for correlating some alerts (e.g., alerts with the same 
source and destination IP addresses), they cannot fully discover the causal relationships 
between related alerts. 
Data mining approach [49] bases AC on attack scenarios specified by human users ot learned 
through training datasets. Obviously, these methods are restricted to known attack 
scenarios. A variation in this class uses a consequence mechanism to specify what types 
of attacks may follow a given attack, partially addressing this problem [38]. 
Causal relationship approach [4,7,24,25] is based on the cause-effect idea. It correlates alerts if 
the pre-condition of some later alerts are satisfied by the consequences of some earlier 
alerts. This approach can potentially uncover the causal relationship between alerts, and 
is not restricted to known attack scenarios. 
Pre-conditions and post-conditions approach is usually depends on rules or predefined 
knowledge. Templeton and Levitt [24] propose a requires/provides mpdel (JIG SAW) for 
modeling chains of network exploits. The model links exploits into scenarios, with earlier 
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exploits supplying the prerequisites for the later ones. The requires part corresponds to 
the action preconditions/causes, and the provi'!es part corresponds to the action effects. 
They describe a language for specifying exploits and point out that relating seemingly 
innocuous system behavior to known attack scenarios can help discover new exploits. 
And, they do not consider combining their attack scenarios into attack graphs. However, 
several problems make it difficult for JIGSAW to be a practical AC technique. First, 
JIGSAW requires all the preconditions of an attack to be satisfied in order to consider its 
consequences. This is theoretically acceptable; however. it has a negative impact on AC 
in practice. In particular, if the IDS fails to detect one of the attacks that prepare for later 
attacks, JIGSAW will miss the opportunity to correlate the detected attacks. 
The MIRADOR [4,25] approach also correlates alerts using partial match of pre-
conditions and post-conditions of attacks, which are derived from attack database 
described in LAMBDA [25], and uses 'ontology rules' to represent the implication 
relationships between predicates. An additional notion of abductive correlation has been 
introduced in [4] to deal with attacks missed by IDS. 
The work closest to MIRADOR is the AC method by [7,48]. They used rule-based AC 
which pre-requisites and consequences of the each alerts need to manually define. 
Intuitively, the pre-requisite of an intrusion is the necessary condition for the intrusion to 
be successful, while the consequence of an intrusion is the outcome of the intrusion if it is 
successful. Once the pre-requisite of a certain attack is detected by the correlation engine, 
it would be possible to predict the consequence ofthe attack. In the same way, it might be 
able to merge them and consequently detect a higher-level correlated attack. They use 
SQL commands for processing the rules and perform AC. Their architecture [7] is shown 
in Figure 4. It consists of a knowledge base, an alert preprocessor, a correlation engine, a 
hyper-alert correlation graph generator, and a visualization component. All these 
components except for the visualization component interact with a Daiabase Management 
System (DBMS), which provides persistent storage for the intermediate data as well as 
the correlated alerts. To save development effort, they use the GraphViz package [50] as 
the visualization component to generate attack graphs. 
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Figure 4. The architecture of hyper-alert correlation system. 
3.3 Issue 3 : Extracting Attack Strategies to Predict Attacker's Next Goal 
Attack scenarios that are successfully directed (or connected) can reveal the attack strategies and 
are normally represented as attack graphs (e.g., attack tree or directed acyclic graph). These attack 
graphs can be manually constructed by security experts using knowledge such as topology and 
vulnerabilities of the protected network. But, this approach is time-consuming, error-prone, 
tedious and impractical [51]. Consequently, a number of AC techniques have been introduced in 
order to help security analysts to learn strategies and patterns of the attackers [39,48,49,52]. 
However, all of these approaches have their own limitations. They either cannot reveal the causal 
relationship among the alerts (they simply group the alerts into scenarios), or require a larger 
number of predefined rules in order to correlate alerts and generate attack graphs [16]. Therefore, 
the problem in this issue is "how to automatically construct attack graphs based on the 
correlated alerts ". 
Several research attempts on generating or constructing attack graph are by [7,16,51]. 
Both [7,51] used open source graph drawing software, called GraphViz [50] to visuali~e attack 
graphs. They need specific prior knowledge about alerts in order to construct the attack graph. In 
addition, [51] include the analysis of the attack graphs (vulnerability analysis) to validate their 
results. They also applied symbolic model checking algorithms [53] to automatically construct 
attack graph. A model of a network and its corrective properties is needed to check the algorithm 
efficacy. 
Different from [16], they did not need any prior knowledge about alerts in order to 
construct the attack graph. The proposed approach is based on two different neural network 
approaches, namely Multilayer Perceptron (MLP) and Support Vector Machine (SVM). The 
probabilistic output of these two methods is used to determine with which previous alerts this 
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current alert should be correlated. This suggests the causal relationship of two alerts, which is 
helpful for constructing attack scenarios. One of the distinguishina feature of the proposed 
technique is that an Alert Correlation Matrix (ACM) is used to store correlation strengths of any 
two types of alerts. ACM is updated in the training process, and the infonnation (correlation 
strength) is then used for extracting high level attack strategies. 
3.4 Other Issues 
In this category, we listed works that are not fall into any above categories mentioned. First, work 
by_ [5] adapted main memory index structures and database query optimization techniques to 
facilitate timely correlation of intensive alerts. Their previous correlation system takes longer 
time of execution. They proposed three techniques named hyper-alert container, two-level index, 
and sort correlation to achieve speed correlation. Secondly, an'other research domain that needed 
in the IDRS problem space is the analysis of the attack graph. Analysis ofthe attack graph can be 
a risk analysis [78], vulnerability analysis [51,69,79]; and shortest path analysis [80]. For 
example in [51], they proposed two kind of analysis namely Minimization Analysis and Minimum 
and Minimal Critical Attack Sets. The former analysis helps analyst to determine a minimal set of 
atomic attacks that must be prevented to guarantee that the attcker cannot achive his/her goal. 
Whilst the latter analysis helps analyst to determine the likelihood that an attacker will succeed or 
the likelihood that the IDS will detect his/her attack activity. 
4. ALERT CORRELAnON TECHNIQUES 
We classified the existing techniques used in AC into three categories as shown in Figure 5. Al 
techniques are widely and commonly explored by researchers followed by probabilistic-based 
technique and model checking technique. Further discussion on each technique is presented in the 
next subsections. 
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rejected regardless of the overall similarity. The new alert is correlated with the most 
similar meta-alert, assuming the similarity is above a specified minimum match threshold. 
Otherwise, the new alert starts a new meta-alert thread. Same approach used in [56], 
which include a statistical causality test -Granger Causality Test (GCn to identify new 
alert relationship. The main advantage of using GCT is that it does not require 'a priori' 
knowledge about attack behaviors and how the attacks could be related. This approach 
can identify the correlation between two attack steps as long as the two have a high 
probability (not necessarily high frequency) of occurring together. 
4.2 Artificial Intelligence (AI) Techniques 
Refer to Figure 5, the most widely used technique in the field of AC are AI technique. AI systems 
or some regards is as expert systems try to reflect actions of a human expert when solving 
problems in a particular domain. Their knowledge base imitates knowledge of a human, which 
may be either 'surface' that resulting from experience, or 'deep' resulting from understanding the 
system behavior from its principles. Most expert systems use rule-based representation of their 
knowledge-base. Expert systems applied to the AC problem differ with respect to the structure of 
the knowledge they use. 
Rule-based - Approaches that rely solely on surface knowledge are referred to as rule-based 
reasoning systems [57]. Ning and his researchers [48] defined a set ofrules for each alerts 
for their pre-requisites and consequences. If any of the consequences of an alert matches 
the pre-requisites of next alert, then those two alerts are correlated. Similar to [38], rules 
describing alerts that are logically linked with each other are manually defined. Whilst in 
[25], they specified knowledge about attack scenarios in attack language, named 
LAMBDA. Other examples of such languages are STATL [58] and JIGSAW [24]. Rule-
based systems, which rely solely on surface knowledge, do not require profound 
understanding of the underlying system architectural and operational principles. However, 
the downsides of rule-based systems include inability to learn from experience, inability 
to deal with unseen problems, and difficulty in updating the system knowledge [59]. 
Model-based - Model-based reasoning systems usually include some form of deep knowledge 
that represents relationships among system entities. As proposed in M2D2 by [46], they 
integrate four main types of information: information systems characteristics, 
vulnerabilities, security tools and events; to facilitate the aggregation and correlation 
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process. Such approach is used as well in [60], where he extracts information from 
operating system-level event logs and firewall alerts together with IDS alerts for alert 
correlation and analysis. Their knowledge may be organized in an expandable, 
upgradeable and modular fashion. However, the models may be difficult to obtain and 
keep up-to-date. 
Case-based - Case-based systems are a special class of expert systems that base their decisions on 
experience and past situations. They try to acquire relevant knowledge of past cases and 
previously used solutions to propose solutions for new problems [59]. They are well 
suited to learning correlation patterns [61]. When a problem is successfully solved, the 
solution (or its parts) may be used in dealing with subsequent problems. Pietraszek [12] 
used the concept of training an alert classifier using a human analyst's feedback and show 
how to build an efficient alert classifier using machine-learning techniques. They analyze 
the desired properties of such a system from the domain perspective and introduce ALAC, 
(an Adaptive Learner for Alert Classification), and its two modes of operation: a 
recommender mode, in which all alerts with their classification are forwarded to the 
analyst, and an agent mode, in which the system uses autonomous alert processing. 
However, time inefficiency (waiting for human analyst's feedback) may make them 
unusable in real-time alert correlation. 
Neural Networks - Neural networks, which are systems composed of interconnected nodes called 
neurons, try to mimic operation of a human brain. They are capable of learning [62] and 
resilient to noise or inconsistencies in the input data. The disadvantage of neural network 
systems is that they require long training periods [61,63], and that their behavior outside 
their area of training is difficult to predict [63]. Some researchers [16] used MLP and 
SYM to group alerts and also to represent the correlated alerts in a way that they reflect 
the corresponding attack scenarios. Both MLP and SYM have their own strengths for AC. 
When knowledge for assigning accurate probabilities to training data is available, MLP 
can produce more precise correlation probabilities. Labeling training patterns for SYM is 
much easier but the outputs are less accurate than the ones produced by MLP. Another 
advantage of using SYM is that its training speed is fast and it is possible to 
incrementally update it in a real time environment. 
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Hybrid Soft-computing - This technique becomes popular nowadays in several research domain 
such as data mining (eg., [64]), controller design (eg., [65]) and property estimation (eg., 
[66]). But in the AC research field, only [67] used Neuro-Fuzzy technique to reduce false 
positives alerts in IDS. They showed that the techniques effectively reduce the false 
positives rate but not the false negatives rate. The idea of using such combination is 
because fuzzy sets are famous at modeling human reasoning and provide a natural 
mechanism for dealing with uncertainty, whilst neural networks are robust to noise and 
have a good ability to model highly non-linear relationships [64]. Moreover, the fusion of 
neural networks and fuzzy logic provides learning as well as readability [68]. On the 
other hand, these soft computing techniques also have some restrictions that do not allow 
their individual application in some cases. Fuzzy sets are dependent on expert knowledge. 
The training times of neural networks are excessive and tedious when the input data are 
large and most neural network systems lack explanation facilities. IlMessaglel 
4.3 Model Checking Techniques 
Model checking is an automatic technique for verifying finite-state reactive systems, such as 
sequential circuit designs and communication protocols. Specifications are expressed in a 
propositional temporal logic, and the reactive system is modeled as a state-transition graph. An 
efficient search procedure is used to determine if the specifications are satisfied by the state-
transition graph. 
Model checker - Typically, the user provides a high level representation of the model and the 
correctness specification to be checked. The procedure uses an exhaustive search of the 
state space of the system to determine if the specification is true or not. Given sufficient 
resources, the procedure will either terminates with the answer true, indicating that the 
model satisfies the specifications or give a counter example execution that shows why the 
correctness formula is not satisfied [69]. Like [69], they used model checking-based 
technique to automatically construct attack graphs. Although it helps facilitate the task of 
defining attack graphs, it has- the limitation of scalability especially for larger, network 
and systems [70]. 
5. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS ON CURRENT ALERT CORRELATION SYSTEMS 
At present no standard performance evaluation strategy exists for ACS [71]. Besides, no dataset 
explicitly designed for testing AC algorithms is publicly available and creating such dataset in the 
lthd 20, Bu. 2 (Dtsember 2008) lumaI Ieknologt Mliklumat 
S .
Jt J l i
27 
field of analyzing intrusion alerts remains an open research problem [72]. As a consequence, a 
direct comparison with results in the literature is rather difficult. Researchers usually evaluate 
their algorithms by performing some experiments on a typical network scenario, and assessing the 
effectiveness of the proposed techniques on such a scenario [73]. The comparative study in this 
paper involved only the most representative work in AC area. Please see Table 1 to see the 
comparison of existing ACSs and its analysis in the next subsection. 
Note that not all the researchers treat correlation issues the same way. Because of that, we 
compared the existing ACSs based on five important operations in an ACS and the definitions for 
each of them are in the following: 
1) Normalization: a process which converting and representing alerts in a standard format. 
Most of the surveyed research groups are using some kind of standard format for their 
alert reporting. Furthermore, most groups are using some variant of Intrusion Detection 
Message Exchange Format (IDMEF) to suit their needs. The use of markup languages, in 
this case Extensible Mark-up Language (XML), simplifies the correlation process in that 
it is easy to identify attributes that are up for correlation. 
2) Verification: a matching and filtering process that can remove/reduce the false positives 
alerts. False alerts give false correlation results. 
3) Aggregation: a process that grouping alerts constituting a single attack and replacing 
them with a single meta-alert. The alerts can be from one or multiple IDSs. This steps can 
eliminates redundancy of alerts. Some referred it as a fusion process. 
4) Correlation: discovers the relationship among alerts or attacks to construct the multi-
stages attack scenarios. 
5) Attack Scenario Analysis: analyzes attack scenarios resulted from prior alert correlation. 
For example an approach to quantitatively analyze and rank various attack paths and 
inform human analysts of the ones with the highest likelihood. 
5.1 Problem in existing Alert Correlation Systems 
As presented in Table 1, most of the proposed approaches (e.g., in [4, 7, 13,15,25,38,45,48, 
52]) have limited capabilities because they rely on various forms of predefined knowledge of 
attacks or attack transition patterns using attack modeling language or pre-conditions and post-
conditions (some referred as prerequisites and consequences) of individual attacks. Therefore, 
those approaches cannot recognize a correlation when an attack is new or the relationship 
between attacks is new. In other words, these approaches in principle are similar to misuse 
detection techniques, which use the signatures of known attacks to perform pattern matching and 
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cannot detect new attacks. It is obvious that the number of possible correlations is very large, 
potentially a combinatorial of the number of known and new attacks. It is infeasible to know 'a 
priori' and encode all possible matching conditions between attacks. In practice, the more Stal 
dangerous and intelligent adversaries will always invent new attacks and novel attack sequences 
[74]. Therefore, a significantly better alert correlation algorithms need to be developed that can 
Probdiscover sophisticated and new attack sequences. 
On the other hand, in the network management system (NMS), most event correlation Prob 
techniques were also depend on various knowledge of underlying networks and the relationship 
( 
among faults and corresponding alerts. In addition, in an NMS, event correlation focuses more on 
alerts resulted from network faults that often have fixed patterns. Therefore, modeling-based or S' 
Prol
rule-based techniques are mostly applied in various correlation systems. Whilst in information 
security, alerts are more diverse and unpredictable because the attackers are intelligent and they 
can use flexible strategies. Therefore, it is difficult to apply correlation techniques developed in 
NMS to the analysis of security alerts [74]. 
In fact, a correlation approach is often composed of multiple correlation approaches. 
There is not a unique solution that is the 'best', in terms of precision and/or complexity, to solve a 
Real-timegeneric problem of alert correlation [71]. Recent researches indicate a tendency for the adoption 
which ale of combinations of different approaches for the solution of the problem in complex networks [75]. 
friendly. 
Table 1. Comparative analysis ofexisting ACSs. explored 
Adaptive, 
-''';:.'.-. -;;KDlk1~fDpD D~~Bm~ .........1" 
.;) 
:' oemKr~
 
fD·~·•..'2' ·.3 by the ho: 
- using attack language called LAMBDA to[4,45,25] Rule-based ...J ...J ...J the detec 
specify known attack scenarios 
- manually defined the prerequisites and accurate I[7,48,52] Rule-based ...J ...J ...J ...J 
consequences of each alerts· a massive work 
- hard-coded rules [13] Rule-based ...J ...J ...J ...J 
- hard to update 
- rules specified manually, very labor [38] Rule-based ...J ...J ...J intensive 
• need to maintain and update rules in 
[15] Rule-based ...J ...J database 
- onlv deal with known attack scenarios 
- integrates various types of security 
[46] Model-based ...J ...J infonnation 
- need to define prerequisites of intrusions 
JUld 20, Bu. 2 (Disember 2008) Jurnal Iekilologl Mliklumat 
!~~~; !fee1b1i~
, .1' , , ,,;" 1'::4', 3'
;
-
l m i
29 
Table 1. Comparative analysis of existing ACSs. (cont'.) 
- use attack sequence pattern mining 
[70] Statistical-based ~ ~ ~ ~ 
- introduce correlativity value which based on 
statistical equation, to relate alerts 
- not clear how parameter value in the 
equation is detennined 
- group alerts based on similarity of attributes 
[39] Probabilistic-based ~ ~ ~ - thus cannot reveal causal relationship 
between alerts 
[49] 
Probabilistic-based 
& 
Case-based 
~ ~ ~ 
- use various data mining techniques for 
learning from labeled data. The best is 
decision tree. 
- labeling alerts is manual, tedious 
- use Bayesian and time series-based causal 
[56,74,76] Statistical & Probability based ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 
analysis algorithm, GCT, no predefine rules 
- not clear how they reduce false alerts 
- can discover new attack relationship 
6. OPEN RESEARCH PROBLEMS 
Several ACSs have being developed but there is currently no silver-bullet solution to the AC 
problem [77]. Based on the survey and analysis conducted, the following research directions are 
worth to be explored: 
1) Real-time correlation: Most of the previous works are based on off-line correlation, 
which alerts are first collected and stored in a databases. It is cost-effective and resource-
friendly. Although real-time or on-line correlation uses larger memo")', it is worth to be 
explored if one wants to apply an effective real-time response plan. 
2) Adaptive correlation: Most attacks are at the application level, and they are best detected 
by the host-based IDSs. It is believed that the cooperation of multiple IDSs may improve 
the detection rate. As a consequence, more accurate alerts shall contribute to more 
accurate and reliable ACS. 
3) Datasets and validation: At present no standard performance evaluation strategy exists 
for ACS. Besides, no dataset explicitly designed for testing AC algorithms is publicly 
available. How such a dataset can be produced and validated is an open research problem 
as well. 
7. CONCLUSION 
The aim of this survey is to provide adequate information and review to newcomers to the field as 
well as a good reference guide for security analysts. Important concepts, challenges, existing 
techniques and possible research directions in the field of AC are thoroughly discussed. It is 
important to note that not all the researchers treat AC issues the same way. The automation of 
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alerts analysis and correlation certainly improve the alerts quality and reveals the sequence of 
attacks launched by attacker. This step is very important to facilitate analysts in finding the most 
appropriate response and preventive mechanisms or plans such that severe damages can be 
minimized or prevented. This survey showed that a significantly better AC algorithms need to be 
developed that can discover sophisticated and new attack sequences. 
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